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The Law And Survival In A Technological Era
JOHN W. GOFMAN*
ARTHUR R. TAMPLIN**
This special commentary provides a critical review of some of
the serious hazards associated with modern technological innovation
and the substandard interest in the health, safety and welfare of
man and the preservation of a safe environment. The authors,
scientific experts in the field of atomic energy, draw from their
work experience with nuclear technology in presenting some provoc-
ative examples of apathy on the part of governmental and industry
concerning the long term adverse effects of technological innovation
and resulting by-products. In addition the article elaborates on
several specific proposals directed to legislative and regulatory
governmental bodies concerning the exercise of their responsibility
for regulation of new technology. The authors caution that their
proposals represent only minimum practical considerations to be
fulfilled before proceeding with any new technology.
We have been rudely awakened in the past several years to the rea-
lization that our environmental integrity, and thence our health, may
be compromised through the injection of technology's by-products into
the environment. The most pessimistic among students of ecology con-
sider that this process has already proceeded beyond hope of repair, and
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that human and other species may not survive. The most optimistic
see no problem at all. Generally the latter group is closely associated
with the entrepreneurs of technology. Whether our oceans are already
irreversibly compromised by heavy metals, DDT, or other poisons yet
to be washed into the oceans from sources already provided by man's
technologies is problematical. If so, there is little more than academic
interest in discussing rational possibilities for future behavior.
On the other hand, while we should be thoroughly warned, we may
not as yet be beyond the point of no return. In this case it does in-
deed behoove us to examine why technological advance can lead us to
the brink of environmental disaster. And having done this, it would
seem profitable to ask how we might improve our future behavior,
with the express view of trying to enhance the chances for survival of
living things, plant and animal. In particular, these are imperative
questions shrouded by simple responses-confusion, self-interest, nai-
vete. Why do major legislative bodies not act to safeguard the multi-
tude of constituency? Why have their past actions been inadequate,
inconsiderate, incompetent? What should be done?
The endeavor of these writers in the pages that follow is to present
some factual allegations and practical considerations derived from sci-
entific training and experience. It is hoped that these considerations
will be impressed upon the legal minds of all the bodies of legislative
representatives throughout the country, whether they are now, or at
some future time will be confronted with the implementation of a new
technology and the uncertain potential of the technology by-products for
producing deleterious consequences upon the environment.
We were introduced into such considerations through our experi-
ences in atomic energy. What we have learned through such experi-
ences is, to be sure, of great relevance concerning errors, and their cor-
rection, in programs of peaceful and military applications of atomic
energy. However, far more general lessons are available from such
experiences; lessons that should be applicable to a large spectrum of
current, or potential, technological by-product poisons. Atomic energy
programs, especially nuclear fission for electricity generation, present
more glaring, overt examples of mishandling of a technology than do
some others. A focus upon such programs is, therefore, especially
helpful in delineating larger problems.
The Societal Justification for Technology
There was a time when invention and innovation could perhaps
have been regarded as self-evident benefits to man. The simple ma-
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chines such as the lever, the wheel, or the pulley would seem to be ex-
amples. The internal combustion engine-driven automobile, descended
from the wheel, is not at all a clear and unqualified boon to man, at
least in its present relationship to society and the environment. Broadly,
however, innovation has had such wide acceptance for its "miracles"
that few would, until recently, have questioned the "obvious" benefits
of technological advance. The reason for questioning arises because
of by-product poisons or by-product effects upon our health or way
of life, either as a result of manufacturing activities or utilization asso-
ciated with innovations. It has become apparent that the process by
which scientific discovery, invention, or innovation translates into ma-
jor technological endeavor, including industrial manufacture, opera-
tion, and distribution does not necessarily encompass a thorough ac-
counting for potential by-product "undesirables", nor for the effects of
such "undesirables". Why should it be that so very late in the period
of technological development of our society we arrive at this realiza-
tion? Answering this requires some critical examination of the way
technology and innovation are introduced and operated.
We shall approach several facets of technological innovation, illus-
trate the pitfalls accompanying each, and suggest possible legislative
remedies for protecting the public interest.
The Promotional Bias of Technological Innovation
Inventiveness and innovation are encouraged as the bases for new
industrial and manufacturing endeavor in a profit-oriented society, as
well as in societies otherwise organized. In either case the presump-
tion is made that more, bigger, and better products will necessarily en-
hance what we call the "standard of living." Many have appropriately
questioned whether the real quality of life is thereby truly improved.
It is a characteristic of innovative endeavor that enthusiasm and drive
are prominent features. If the enterprise orginates in the private sec-
tor, the lure of economic profit is ever-present, and enthusiasm is di-
rectly related to the magnitude of potential future profitability. If the
enterprise originates in the public sector, e.g., in a governmental agency,
there is the promise of "service to the public", as well as the potential for
transfer to the private sector with ultimate economic gain.
It would seem of little moment to question whether such enthusiasm
is intrinsically undesirable. In truth, it is doubtful that anything new
would ever be undertaken without enthusiasm on the promotional side.
What is worth emphasizing here is that dollars in huge numbers are a
prime requisite for an innovative enterprise of any consequence. And
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it is, of course, precisely such enterprises which must concern us, for
these are the ones whose by-products can affect a large segment of the
nation's population. Entrepreneurs who are about to invest sizeable
amounts of capital are not likely to do so if the recommendation by
scientists and engineers is hedged with numerous concerns over poten-
tially deleterious by-products or side effects of the new technology.
Overtly and covertly such technologists necessarily will tend to see the
great promise of the enterprise in producing societal benefits. Hazards
will be minimized or overlooked in their "sales" procedure and, fur-
ther, the technologists are characterized by an undying optimism that
science and technology can provide a technical solution for all the po-
tential hazards of environmental or health degradation.
If the enterprise has persisted in the developmental stage for some
period of time, the investment of capital will have grown, men will
have commited prestige to it, and reconsideration becomes increasingly
difficult, both for the technologists and the entrepreneurs. The result
is that optimism concerning the enterprise is widely expressed; doubts
and hazards are rarely encountered.
A remarkable case in point is the utilization of the atom, via nuclear
fission, for generation of electricity. In this case, a governmental bu-
reau, the Atomic Energy Commission, promoted the technology. Con-
gress, in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946,1 had given the AEC the spe-
cific mandate to seek out beneficial applications of atomic energy, in
addition to the mandate to provide nuclear weapons for the national se-
curity. Controlled chain reactions, utilizing nuclear fission as the
source of energy, had been demonstrated to be operable during the
wartime production of plutonium. The utilization of such nuclear-
fission reactors to produce heat and, thence, steam to drive electricity-
generating turbines was obviously possible. The enormous amount of
energy available per pound of uranium appeared attractive.' The
availability of unlimited electric power appeared to be an obvious bene-
fit to society. Small wonder that the AEC launched enthusiastically
upon its campaign to sell the idea that nuclear electric power was to
become one of the peacetime blessings of the atom.' And in the early
days of that promotion the promise was suggested that electric power
from the atom would be so cheap as not to be worth metering.4 Elimi-
nation of dirty coal mining, coal hauling, belching smokestacks of fos-
1. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq.
2. U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMm'N, UNDERSTANDING THE ATOM, Nuclear Reactors(available through U.S. AEC, P.O. Box 62, Oakridge, Tenn. 37830).
3. See keynote address of C.E. Bagge, Vice-Chairman of the Federal Power
Commission, before the American Power Conference in Chicago, Illinois, April 21,
1970.
4. Id.
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sil-fueled plants all looked attractive. It is not difficult to understand
the enthusiasm with which the AEC carried forward its mission of de-
veloping this particular beneficial application of atomic energy. And
for the reasons outlined above, it is not difficult to understand the rose-
colored glasses through which nuclear power generation was viewed
by AEC technologists, with respect to issues like hazards and econom-
ics. Congressional appropriations are not enhanced by too fervent a
presentation of the potentially negative aspects of a technology.
So the public and the Congress was sloganeered with "clean, cheap,
safe" nuclear power.' Yet, today, many years down the pike, there is
a large and growing public resistance to the installation of nuclear elec-
tric power plants in numerous areas of the country.' Indeed, there is
strong citizen and environmentalist opposition to essentially every exist-
ing or proposed installation. 7 Very serious challenges have been pre-
sented to each of the three facets of the AEC's slogan---"clean, cheap,
safe." It is clear to everyone that nuclear power is anything but cheap,
in spite of the numerous subsidies this industry has so generously been
provided. Serious questions have been raised concerning the "clean"
aspects of nuclear power. There is significant evidence that the guide-
lines for permissible public exposure to radiation from "peaceful atom"
programs can lead to a public health calamity of major proportions.8
For example, the Federal Radiation Council (now incorporated into the
Environmental Protection Agency) had specified that the U.S. popu-
lation could legally be exposed to a radiation value averaging 0.17 rads
(1 rad represents 100 ergs of ionizing radiation energy per gram of
tissue)Y Recent estimates show, however, that such an exposure, by
5. GOFMAN AND TAMPLIN, PosioNoE POWER: THE CASE AGAINST NUCLEAR
POWER PLANTS, The Nuclear Juggernaut, introduction (1971).
6. See, e.g., citizens interventions at construction and licensing hearings for
nuclear electricity plants:
(1) The Sierra Club with respect to the Bodega Head Reactor proposed by
Pacific, Gas and Electric Corporation;
(2) The Lloyd Harbor Study Group intervention (1971) in the Shoreham,
L.I., proposed Reactor of Long Island Lighting Corporation;
(3) Multiple Intervenors v. Consumers Power Company (with respect to the
Palisades Nuclear Plant), AEC Reports, Vol. 3, Opinions & Decisions,
175 (1967).
(a) Michigan Steelhead and Salmon Fisherman's Association.(b) Thermal Ecology Must be Preserved.
(c) Concerned Petitioning Citizens.
(d) Michigan Lake and Stream Associations, Inc.
(e) Sierra Club.
7. See, e.g., speech by H.C. Brown, Jr., The AEC Goes Public, A Case Study
in Confrontation, before the Atomic Industrial Forum's Topical Conference on Nu-
clear Public Information, Los Angeles, California, February 11, 1970.
8. Gofman and Tamplin, Low Dose Radiation and Cancer, in INsTrrUTE FOR
ELECTRICAL Am ELEC'RONIC ENGINEER TRANSACTIONS ON NUCLEAR SCIENCE, 1-9(NS-17, February 1970).
9. FEDERAL RADIATION CoUNcm, STAFF REPORT No. 1, Background Material for
the Development of Radiation Protection Standards, Part V, at 26-30 (May 13, 1960).
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no means reached yet, would ultimately lead to 32,000 extra cancer
and leukemia deaths per year in the exposed population. 10 Further, it
has been indicated that the genetic mutation rate would be increased
between 5 and 50% from this exposure, leading ultimately (in several
generations) to between 100,000 and 1,000,000 extra deaths per year
from genetically determined diseases for a population of 200-million
persons.'1 So the guidelines of "permissible" or "allowable" exposures
under which peaceful atom programs, such as nuclear electricity gen-
eration, proceed are under serious challenge with respect to accepta-
bility.
Numerous challenges have been made in state after state concerning
AEC permissible radio-activity releases to the air and water, with con-
cern over irreversible fouling of the environment."2 Disposal of astro-
nomical quantities of radioactive fission products (inevitable by-products
of nuclear electricity generation) has properly aroused serious concern.
A National Academy of Sciences report has criticized AEC disposal
practices at several installations. 3 An acceptable mode of disposal (or
more properly, guardianship) of these fantastic quantities of radioactive
waste from nuclear electricity generation, while under development, has
by no means been successfully put into operation.' 4  Yet nuclear reac-
tors are being planned and installed in numerous metropolitan areas'5
and, if operated, will generate these enormous quantities of radioactive
waste. The nuclear power plants now on drawing boards and being
built are commonly of the order of 1,000 megawatts, electrical. In
one year of operation such a plant generates long-persistent radioac-
tive fission products equivalent to those produced by a 20-megaton nu-
clear fission bomb (approximately 1,000 times that of the bomb ex-
ploded over Hiroshima, Japan).' 6 So with respect to potential environ-
mental contamination and injury to public health, nuclear electricity
10. TAMPLIN AND GOFMAN, POPULATION CONTROL THROUGH NUCLEAR POLLUTION
16 (1970).
11. Id. at 22-27.
12. E.g., the State of Minnesota Pollution Control Agency proposed regulations
for the Monticello Plant of Northern States Power Company in 1969 which were fifty
times more stringent than AEC regulations. The Vermont Public Health Department
has done likewise for the Vernon, Vermont, Yankee Nuclear Power Plant, 1970; as has
the Illinois Pollution Control Agency for the Dresden-rn Nuclear Plant of Common-
wealth Edison Company, 1971.
13. Report to the Division of Reactor Development and Technology by the
National Research Council to the Atomic Energy Commission, May, 1966 (unpub.
lished report available from National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C.).
14. A Nuclear Graveyard, NEWSWEEK, March 29, 1971, at 60.
15. See U.S. AToMIc ENERGY COMMISSION, NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IN TME
UNITED STATES, June 30, 1970. (This report covers plants operable, plants being
built, and those planned. It is updated biannually and is available through the U.S.
AEC, Washington, D.C.) As of June 30, 1970, 95 such plants in toto were oper-
able, being built, or planned.
16. J. GOFMAN AN A. TAMPLIN, POISONED POWER: THE CASE AOAINST NUCLEAR
POWER PLANTS, The Nuclear Legacy: Radioactive Wastes and Plutonium, c.8 (1971).
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generation is by no means obviously clean. Whether all steps in the
complex pathway from uranium mining to ultimate radioactive waste
disposal can be accomplished without environmental fouling and popu--
lation over-exposure to radiation is extremely problematical. We wit-
ness utterances by the AEC and the electric utility industry that the
public will never receive more than a small fraction of the "permissi-
ble" exposure.' 7  At the same time the AEC fights desperately to pre-
vent any reduction in the codified "permissible" doses to the public.
This overt inconsistency in promises and actions has resulted in wide-
spread skepticism concerning AEC credibility.
Lastly, with respect to "safe" nuclear power generation, it can be
stated flatly that no one is in any position to predict the risk of a major
accident at a nuclear power plant. Bland, unsupported guesses abound
from nuclear power promoters.' The unadorned fact is that we sim-
ply have no actuarial experience on nuclear power plants that would
allow assurance that the risk of a major accident is as low as one per
hundred per year.'" Yet such plants are now being built close to ma-
jor metropolitan centers throughout the country. If one considers that
we are told there will be 100 such installations by 1980,20 we find
there is no reassurance we won't have one major accident per year.
The AEC itself produced a study which indicated that a major acci-
dent could result in seven billion dollars worth of property damage
and require evacuation of several hundred thousand humans. 2' Since
that report was prepared, the reactors being built are some five times
larger, and because of longer planned operating cycles, may contain,
overall, 10 times as high an inventory of long-lived radioactivity. One
author, W. H. Jordan, has suggested that additional engineering safe-
guards might cut the potential radioactivity release in an accident by
10-fold. -1 2 But, with 10 times the inventory present, this still could lead
to the same disastrous consequences as those described in AEC's earlier
report. So the "safe" aspect of nuclear electricity generation is any-
thing but accepted. There simply exists no evidence to document
17. See, e.g., speech of T. Thompson, AEC Commissioner (deceased), Power
Technology and the Future, delivered at Briefing Conference for State and Local
Government Officials on Nuclear Development, Columbia, South Carolina, May 21,
1970.
18. See, e.g., Speech by G.T. Seaborg, AEC Chairman, Misunderstanding the
Atom, delivered at the National Press Club Luncheon, in Washington, D.C., March 22,
1971.
19. INGLIS, Nuclear Energy and the Malthusian Dilemma in SCIENCE AND PUBLIC
AFFAIRS: THE BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTs, January, 1971, at 14.
20. See note 15 supra.
21. U.S. AToMIc ENERGY CoMMIssIoN, THEORETICAL PossmiLiTIES AND CoNsE-
QUENCES OF MAJOR AcciDENTs IN LARGE NUCLEAR POWER PLANTs, WASH-740, March,
1957.
22. Jordan, Nuclear Energy: Benefits versus Risks, PHYsics TODAY, May, 1970,
at 32.
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safety. Jordan has suggested "the only way we will know what the
odds really are is by continuing to accumulate experience in operating
reactors."2  Residents of major metropolitan centers ask why they
should be the guinea pigs in this gigantic experiment to determine the
chance of a major nuclear power plant accident.
Nuclear electric power, with all of its sloganeered virtues, cheap-
ness, cleanness, and safety, is under serious challenge. And such chal-
lenge is not being answered satisfactorily after many years of research
and development. Indeed, the challenges are not being answered at
a moment when major plants are being designed, built, and put into
operation.
Any intelligent person is, of course, led to ask why all the hard ques-
tions have not been asked earlier in this development of nuclear elec-
tricity. Hasn't anyone been given a mandate to investigate the hazards
of nuclear electricity generation? Of course, such a mandate has been
provided-to the Atomic Energy Commission. Through the action of
Congress, this one executive agency was asked to seek out beneficial ap-
plications of atomic energy and to do so with due concern for the pub-
lic health and safety. 24  The evidence indicates that such a dual charge
is an impossible responsibility.
The very nature of technological innovation, in atomic energy or in
other areas, is such that the promotional aspect cannot fail to dominate
where both promotional and regulatory functions are under one roof.
But the difficulty goes much deeper. Even if the functions are sep-
arated, it is rare that adequate funding would be provided to enable dis-
covery and publicity concerning the adverse potentialities of any new
technology. Thus, we truly have a major missing institution in our tech-
nological era---adversary assessment of technology.
Legislation is urgently needed to establish this missing institution."
Unless some reprisal-free group is given a specific mandate to search
out the potentially adverse aspects of a new technology, it can hardly
be expected that the entrepreneurs, private or governmental, will do so.
Atomic energy is a classic case where the entrepreneurs have failed to
23. Id.
24. Atomic Energy Act. of 1946, 42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq.
25. Although the AEC is a federal agency the federal government has not
totally preempted the field for regulation of the associated problems in the nuclear
technology. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended in 1959, expressly allows
the Atomic Energy Commission to delegate regulatory powers over certain atomic
radiation hazards to the states. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2021. California concluded such an
agreement with the Atomic Energy Commission in 1962, and codified it as CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25875, 25876. Presently the states may regulate by
product materials, source materials, and special nuclear materials not sufficient to
form a critical mass. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25876.
610
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provide the "other side of the picture" openly and forthrightly. Nor
should this reasonably be expected of the promoters of a technology.
The legislative response we suggest requires that whenever a new ma-
jor technology is considered, a certain fraction of the investment should
be placed into an agency, free of domination by the entrepreneur. The
funds so set aside should finance a vigorous adversary group of scien-
fists and technologists (plus economic and social scientists) with the ex-
plicit mission of developing the strongest case against the new tech-
nology. Further, the findings of such adversaries must be placed in the
open forum so that a dialogue in full public view can be conducted
between the promoters of a technology and the adversaries.
Some may suggest that such a process could prevent the development
of any new technology. Not at all. If the promoters of a new enter-
prise cannot answer the adversary arguments, they obviously have fur-
ther homework to do before exposing the environment and the public
to the potential hazards of the technology. And if the dialogue is held
behind closed doors, the opportunity for suppression of findings is self-
evident.
This article proposes that such legislation, in order to develop the
other side of the picture, encompass technologies introduced either by
the private or the public sector. We submit that the cost of the adver-
sary investigations will, in general, be very small compared to the cost
of the technology itself, probably far under one percent of the funding of
the development of the technology. 26 Had such a viable institution
of adversary assessment existed during the past 20 years of atomic
energy development, it is extremely doubtful that the current heated
debate over nuclear electrical generation would exist.
There is considerable latitude for description of precisely how the
adversary function should be set up. This is a fertile field for the coun-
try's legislative bodies to explore. The key requirements are:
(a) Independence and reprisal-free status for the adversaries.
(b) Open, public presentation of the adversary findings.
(c) All major technological innovations must be subjected to ad-
versary assessment at an early point in their development.
Public Disenfranchisement
Atomic energy presents us with another extreme example of danger-
ous practices in a technological era, practices which definitely require
legislative remedies. Only poorly known to most of the public, includ-
26. Gofman and Tamplin, A Proposal to Establish an Adversary System of Sci-
entific Inquiry, 9 ENVIRONMENT AcTION BULLETIN, January 2, 1971, at 4-6.
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ing, no doubt, an appreciable segment of the legal profession, are two
pernicious features of the development of nuclear electricity. These
are:
(1) Loss of the right to redress in the event of property damage
from nuclear power accidents.
(2) Loss of insurance protection in the event of nuclear accident
damage to property.
(1) Loss of right to redress.
As the Atomic Energy Commission proceeded with its development
of nuclear electric power technology, it attempted to interest the elec-
tric utility industry to start building nuclear power plantsY A reluctant
utility industry expressed concern over the potential liability in the event
of a nuclear disaster.28  The private insurance industry refused to insure
against such liability for the obvious reason that the potential cost was
estimated to be enormous. 29 Atomic power development appeared to
face an impasse. Congress, under the prodding of the Joint Commit-
tee on Atomic Energy, resolved this problem by passage, in 1957, of
the Price-Anderson Act,30 possibly the worst piece of legislation perti-
nent to technology. This Act established a ceiling on the liability for
damages arising out of an accident in a nuclear power facility. Origi-
nally, the maximum liability was set at 500-million dollars;31 later in-
creased to 560-million dollars.3 2  Even so, the private insurance in-
dustry refused to carry more than 82-million dollars of this insurance
liability, so the public assumed the burden for the remainder of the
478-million dollars worth of insurance.33 Now, since estimates of po-
tential damage have ranged in the neighborhood of 7-billion dollars,3 4
it appears inescapable that, at best, the public stands to recover seven
cents on each dollar of property damage from a major nuclear power
plant accident. This can hardly be regarded as a good prospect of re-
dress for damage incurred from the nuclear electricity technology.
The electric utility industry, freed of liability, was willing to build nu-
clear power plants after the Price-Anderson Act was passed.
It is hard to understand why an agency of government, such as the
27. See note 3 supra.
28. See note 5 supra.
29. See note 21 supra.
30. Price-Anderson Act, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 STAT. 576.
31. Id. at § 170(c).
32. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, c. 724, § 170, 60 STAT. 755, as amended,
Pub. L. 89-645, §§ 2, 3, 80 STAT. 891.
33. Green, The Risk/Benefit Calculus in Nuclear Power Licensing, in SympOSiuM
ON NuCLEAR POWER AND THE PunLic, University of Minnesota, October 10-11, 1969
(1970).
34. See note 21 supra.
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United States Atomic Energy Commission, should be permitted to li-
cense the construction and operation of nuclear power plants that are
uninsurable. If, as the optimists of the AEC and the electric utility in-
dustry claim, nuclear power plants are safe, they should certainly be
insurable. If they are not safe enough to be insured fully, they clearly
are not safe enough to be licensed. The Price-Anderson Act should be
repealed forthwith, and similar future legislation absolving industries of
liability for damage they may produce should itself be prohibited by
some type of legislation.
(2) Loss of insurance protection.
As the nuclear electricity industry burgeoned forth, the private insur-
ance industry observed it carefully and took important action over and
above its refusal to insure the nuclear power plants directly. Presented
here are two exclusion clauses from a homeowner's insurance policy.35
Such clauses are the rule in current homeowner's policies.
Nuclear Clause-Section I: The word 'fire' in this policy or en-
dorsements attached hereto is not intended to and does not em-
brace nuclear reaction or nuclear radiation or radioactive contami-
nation, all whether controlled or uncontrolled, and loss by nuclear
reaction or nuclear radiation or radioactive contamination is not in-
tended to be and is not insured against by this policy or said en-
dorsements, whether such loss be direct or indirect, proximate
or remote, or be in whole or in part caused by, contributed to, or
aggravated by 'fire' or any other perils insured against by this policy
or said endorsements; however, subject to the foregoing and all pro-
visions of this policy, direct loss by 'fire' resulting from nuclear re-
action or nuclear radiation or radioactive contamination is insured
against by this policy.
Nuclear Exclusion--Section I: This policy does not insure
against loss by nuclear reaction or nuclear radiation or radioactive
contamination, all whether controlled or uncontrolled, or due to any
act or condition incident to any of the foregoing, whether such
loss be direct or indirect, proximate or remote, or be in whole or
in part caused by, contributed to, or aggravated by any of the perils
insured against by this policy; and nuclear reaction or nuclear radi-
ation or radioactive contamination, all whether controlled or uncon-
trolled, is not 'explosion' or 'smoke'. This clause applies to all
perils insured against hereunder except the perils of fire and light-
ning which are otherwise provided for in the nuclear clause con-
tained above.
35. Hartford Insurance Company, Homeowner's Policy issued to J.W. Gofman,
in force, 1971.
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The private insurance industry has, through such exclusion clauses,
expressed its lack of confidence in the safety of the nuclear electricity
industry. One cannot fault the private insurance industry for taking
the necessary steps to protect itself from the nuclear electricity industry.
One should condemn both the Atomic Energy Commission and the
electric utility industry for failure to point such exclusion clauses out as
they describe the wonders of the atom.
Whenever a technological development occurs, and the private insur-
ance companies resort to exclusion clauses to protect themselves, pub-
lic hearings must be ordered to ascertain why this has occurred. Li-
censing of such technologies should be withheld pending such hearings
and subsequent action. It would seem that under such circumstances
the affected public should be entitled to express their opinions by a
vote on whether or not the technological installation should be per-
mitted. Further, even with such a vote, it should be a requirement
that government provide the full insurance denied by the exclusion
clauses before government is permitted to issue licenses for construc-
tion or operation of such facilities.
The "Standards" Hoax
Most people assume that when a government agency sets a "permissi-
ble", "tolerable", or "allowable"3 6 level of a toxic material, they (the
public) can presume exposures below such a level are without biologi-
cal harm. Witness the use of the term, "standard", to describe such
levels. The very word is meant to imply safety. Where the public de-
rived such confidence is hard to explain, other than the general concept
that government operates in the public interest. Representatives of
governmental agencies and spokesmen for the particular technology
producing such toxic materials unabashedly contribute to the public
misimpression that "permissible" means "safe". The recent history of
the radiation standards controversy is a classic illustration of the hoax
being perpetrated upon a trusting public.
In our work experience with atomic energy and nuclear fission we
have found there is no scientific basis for any "permissible" level of a
toxic substance released into the environment. No scientific basis exists
for designating any amount of radiation as "safe", nor is there any sci-
entific basis for similar "standards" for lead, mercury, chlorinated hy-
drocarbons, or a variety of food additives. In general, it can be quite
fairly stated that all such so-called standards are fabricated from thin
air.
36. 10 C.F.R. Chapter 1, § 20 et seq.; see note 9 supra.
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If a challenge is made concerning safety of so-called "permissible"
levels of a poison such as radioactivity, the agencies involved will gen-
erally retreat to the position that the benefits to be achieved will out-
weigh the risks of exposure at the specified level of the toxic material.
But in no case of which we are aware has a presentation ever been
made to the pulblic (or to anyone else) of the benefits to be received or
of the risks experienced. Moreover, it has never been demonstrated
that the benefits ostensibly to be received are indeed received by those
who suffer the risks.
This entire deception is intimately bound up with the promotional
nature of the technological innovation. Once it becomes clear that a
by-product poison is associated with a technological endeavor, relief is
required for the promoter in the form of a "permissible" dose for public
exposure. The biomedical community is prevailed upon to provide
standards the technology can live with. Obviously the more stringent
the standards, the higher will be the cost of containment for the tech-
nological poison. So the requirement, if the technology is to compete,
is for the greatest possible laxity in the standard-setting procedure. The
biomedical scientists generally chosen to provide the "standards" are ei-
ther directly in the employ of the technology (governmental or private
employer) or are recipients of research grants or consultantships from
the technology. Imputing evil motives to no one, it seems apparent that
a massive conflict of interest exists. If the "standards" are challenged,
resort is quickly sought in the statement, "[o]ur greatest scientific ex-
perts set the standards." This is supposed to dismiss all questions. If,
indeed, this nonsense is accepted for a variety of technologies, we as a
society are assuredly well launched on the path to genocide. For most
of the toxic materials, with radioactivity as a prime example, the seri-
ous effects which concern us are cancer or leukemia 5 to. 40 years
after exposure, teratogenic effects upon fetuses in utero, and genetic ef-
fects, these last only being expressed in one or more generations. Since
the effects are almost invariably delayed, it follows that human evidence
should never be demanded before the toxic material is judged poten-
tially harmful to man. But this is precisely the reverse of our estab-
lished practices for radioactivity and for many other toxic materials of
commerce. We are all narcotized by such statements as, "[n]o detri-
mental effects have been observed in humans for the exposure levels
permitted."31 The unwary public presumes this means that an adequate
37. See remarks by T. Thompson, AEC Commissioner (deceased), prepared for
conference on Nuclear Power and the Environment at the University of Vermont,
September 1, 1969, at 23. (Proceeding available through U.S. A.E.C., Washington,
D.C.)
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set of observations has been made. This is almost never the case.
When the promoters of technology say "no effect observed", it invari-
ably means no meaningful study has been made. But they are rarely
challenged concerning this overt deception. Further, if we are con-
cerned, for example, about genetic mutations in humans, shall we wait
one or more generations to learn that a "permissible" dose of techno-
logical by-product may have compromised the future of the human spe-
cies?
In order to protect the environment in which we live from "the stand-
ards setting hoax", we would recommend that a legislature, faced
with the problem of regulating an existing or proposed technology, take
into account the following minimum practical considerations.
(1) The "Permissible" Level of Toxic Materials Must be Set at Zero.
All Deviations from Zero Pollution Are to be Negotiated.
The so-called "standard-setting" bodies, which are composed of sci-
entific "experts", have been making profound moral judgments for so-
ciety. This is the only interpretation of their setting "standards" based
upon benefit-risk relations. Nothing qualifies any expert to make such
judgments.
It is perfectly proper for bodies of scientific experts to make estimates
of anticipated risk per unit of exposure to a toxic by-product. Such
bodies must be required to present any such risk estimates in an open,
public forum, subject to challenge by independent or adversary groups.
Only in this way will the knowns and uncertainties be thoroughly aired
for such risk estimates.
Any deviation from zero as a "permissible" level of man-made toxic
material must be negotiated before a Pollution Control Board, chosen
to be representative of a broad segment of the public community. Any
such deviation will, in general, represent the moral judgment that hu-
man suffering and premature deaths are acceptable in exchange for a
presumed benefit of a technology. It is this latter realization that makes
expert bodies of scientists so inappropriate for setting allowable expo-
sures. Such experts simply have not been ordained to make moral judg-
ments for society as a whole.
(2) Evidence of Injurious Effects Upon Humans Should Never be a
Requirement for Assessment of Hazard.
Until the present, the philosophy underlying the introduction of by-
product poisons into the environment has been that the potential vic-
tims must prove, through producing human corpses, that harm accrues
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to humans. The burden of proof must be shifted to the polluter; that
is, the polluter should be required to prove safety.
Repeatedly one encounters apology for potentially toxic materials
based upon the statement, "[t]oxicity has only been proved for rats or
mice."
While it is true that response or sensitivity variation in species does
indeed exist, this variation is hardly an excuse for permitting human ex-
posure in the absence of direct evidence in humans. A minimum pub-
lic health principle should be the assumption that humans are at least
as sensitive as the most sensitive experimental animal species tested.
(3) Toxic Effects of a By-Product Must be Assumed to be Propor-
tional to Dose (Unless Positive Evidence to the Contrary is Avail-
able).
It is commonly stated that potential human exposures to toxic by-
products will be at doses much lower than those for which toxic effects
have been demonstrated in experimental animals. It is tacitly hoped,
by promoters, that such a statement will be sufficient to dismiss concern
over low-level exposure. Until and unless proof is presented that the
dose-response relationship is other than direct proportionality, such pro-
portionality must be assumed down to the lowest dose levels.
It may be objected that requirements such as those listed here be re-
stricted to those potentially toxic by-product materials which can affect
significantly large numbers of humans. But modern technology is
characterized by its rapid introduction on a nation-wide basis. As a re-
sult, it is almost a certainty that a very large segment of the population
will rapidly be exposed to risk by any toxic products of the technology.
Summary
This article has endeavored to identify some serious hazards asso-
ciated with burgeoning technologies. Atomic energy provides prime
examples of the kinds of hazards that can arise. Legislative remedies
are urgently needed as a beginning effort to cope with such hazards, for
atomic energy or similar technologies. We believe there is serious rea-
son for questioning the survivability of the human species in the ab-
sence of legislation directed toward provision of remedies. It is felt,
further, that our task is to point out the general aspects of the kind of
legislative relief required. The legislature is far better qualified to con-
sider the detailed implementations of such recommendations.
